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Social Science Research and Reforms of International
Institutions
Weijia Rao

Abstract
Building on Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton and Tom Ginsburg’s call for more social
science research in international law, this Essay discusses ways in which social science research
can be applied to inform reforms of international institutions. In the face of significant challenges
to the current international legal order, active reform discussions have been ongoing concerning a
number of international institutions. This Essay posits that in developing proposals to reform
these international institutions, more attention should be paid to identify the causes of existing
problems, which is important in an international setting where decision-making requires the
consensus of multiple stakeholders. The social science approach can be useful in this regard. Using
investor-state dispute settlement as an example, this Essay discusses how the social science
approach can be applied to help understand the causes of the problem of excessive duration and
costs of investor-state arbitration proceedings. Findings from social science research highlight the
importance of mechanisms which insulate respondent state decision makers from domestic political
pressure. These mechanisms deserve more attention in ongoing ISDS reform discussions.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
After a period of robust growth with the creation of a significant number of
new international courts and tribunals, international law has now come to a phase
of backlashes and recalibration. Several African countries have withdrawn from
the International Criminal Court (ICC) amid criticism of the court’s bias against
African countries.1 One of the rallying points during the Brexit campaign was the
Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU’s) jurisdiction over the United
Kingdom, jurisdiction which has come to an end following the finalization of
Brexit.2 Latin American countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have
withdrawn from the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) Convention after a series of claims being filed by foreign investors against
these countries at ICSID.3 Other countries have, en masse, terminated the bilateral
investment treaties into which they entered. 4 Even the World Trade
Organization’s (WTO) dispute settlement system, which was once viewed as the
“crown jewel” of the WTO, has now become partially paralyzed because of the
United States’ continuous objections to the reappointment of Appellate Body
Members.5
In the meantime, countries are actively engaging in discussions of reforming
international courts and tribunals. More than forty-five countries are participating
in discussions of possible reforms of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
under the auspices of Working Group III of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 6 Major WTO member countries also
agree that the system needs reform and have started dialogues on this topic. 7
1

2

3

4

South Africa: Withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
CN.786.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Oct. 25, 2016); Burundi: Withdrawal from Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. C.N.805.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Oct. 28, 2016);
Gambia: Withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
C.N.862.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Nov. 11, 2016).
Eleanor Bennett, UK Government Trumpets Renewed ‘Control of Our Laws’ and End of ECJ Jurisdiction
After Making EU Brexit Deal, JURIST (Dec. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/ZDG4-L363.
Matthew Weiniger, Christian Leathley & Joanne Greenaway, Venezuela Follows Bolivia and Ecuador
with Plans to Denounce ICSID Convention, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 19, 2012), https://perma.cc/RSE4-7CU4.
Kavaljit Singh & Burghard Ilge, India Overhauls Its Investment Treaty Regime, FIN. TIMES (Jul. 15, 2016),
https://perma.cc/GPR7-BNHU; see also Ben Bland & Shawn Donnan, Indonesia to Terminate More
than 60 Bilateral Investment Treaties, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014), https://perma.cc/BVQ4-PUKR.

5

Cosette Creamer, From the WTO’s Crown Jewel to Its Crown of Thorns, 113 AJIL UNBOUND 51, 51
(2019).

6

Julian Arato, ISDS Reform: Working Group III Gets Down to Brass Tacks, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG
(Oct. 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/7KEZ-H29J.

7

Isabelle Icso, USTR Nominee on the WTO: U.S. ‘Can’t Afford’ Continued Disengagement, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE (Feb. 26, 2021), https://perma.cc/3QLV-P2HD; Hannah Monicken, EU Moves Closer to
U.S. on Appellate Body, Other WTO Reforms In New Strategy, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Feb. 18, 2021),
https://perma.cc/U4L7-B7UB.
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Other international courts such as the ICC and CJEU have also been the subject
of reform proposals propelled by criticism against these institutions.8
As Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg note in their article, the evolution of
scholarship on international law has always been influenced by real-world
problems.9 While earlier literature takes a largely theoretical approach to studying
problems arising from international law practice, in the past two decades, there
has been an empirical turn in international law scholarship.10 Nevertheless, until
recently, this line of empirical research has been largely motivated by high-level
questions from prior theoretical debates, such as how international law is
produced and whether international law matters. 11 While empirically assessing
these issues can have implications for larger normative questions, it often does
not speak directly to which normative prescriptions should be adopted to address
real-world problems in international law.
This Essay argues that the backlash international law is currently facing, and
the ongoing reforms of international institutions underscore the need for more
social science research that is geared toward examining the causes of existing
institutional problems. Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg describe social science
research as identifying a research question, developing a specific hypothesis that
can be empirically assessed, identifying a research design and data to assess the
validity of the hypothesis, and presenting results while acknowledging the
assumptions upon which they are based and the level of uncertainty associated
with those results.12 Building on their framework, this Essay proposes that to help
inform the reform of various international institutions, more social science
research should approach an existing institutional problem by asking which
factors may have caused the problem, generating testable hypotheses based on a
potential cause, and developing a research design that allows one to draw causal
inferences about the effect of this cause.
Understanding the causes of a problem helps inform more tailored
institutional reforms that specifically address these underlying causes. This is
particularly important in the context of reforms of international legal institutions
because of the wide variety of stakeholders. For example, during the ISDS reform
discussions at UNCITRAL Working Group III, while countries generally agreed
that the existing ISDS system needs reform, their positions diverged considerably
8

Douglas Guilfoyle, Reforming the International Criminal Court: Is It Time for the Assembly of State Parties to
Be the Adults in the Room?, EJIL: TALK! (May 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/CYS3-4RGQ.

9

Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton & Tom Ginsburg, The Social Science Approach to International Law, 22
CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2021).

10

Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J.
INT’L L. 1, 1 (2012).

11

See id. at 2–3, 12.
Abebe et al., supra note 9, at 12–13.

12
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as to which reforms to pursue.13 After multiple rounds of discussions over the
past three years, countries have identified six major areas of concerns over ISDS:
“excessive costs, excessive duration of proceedings, lack of consistency in legal
interpretation, incorrectness of decisions, lack of arbitral diversity, and lack of
independence, impartiality, and neutrality of ISDS adjudicators.”14 With respect to
each of these concerns, the Working Group has put forward various reform
options.15 Countries have expressed divergent views on these options and have
yet to reach consensus on the adoption of any reforms.16 Social science research
that clearly identifies the causes of existing problems will help facilitate consensus
building amongst countries and provide guidance in terms of which reform option
may be best suited to address a particular problem. Indeed, each reform option
comes with its own trade-offs.17 This makes it even more important to obtain a
comprehensive understanding of the existing problem first, instead of rushing to
implement reforms that may not get at the real causes of the problem.
As Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg note in their article, social science research
is pluralistic in methods. 18 Both qualitative and quantitative methods can be
instrumental in enhancing our understanding about the causes of a particular
problem in the study of international law. However, the emphasis of these two
types of methods is slightly different. Qualitative methods are more often applied
to locate the potential causes of a problem, whereas quantitative methods are
more often applied to assess the effect of a particular causal factor.19 For example,
one may conduct interviews to understand what has caused a particular problem
and, on the other hand, apply a reduced-form analysis using observational data to
identify the effect of a potential cause. Social scientists should embrace the use of
both methods and, as Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg suggest in their article, pick
the method most appropriate to the problem at hand.20
In applying quantitative methods to the study of international law, one major
challenge is causal identification. International law, by its nature, is influenced by
various forces working together. It can be difficult to tease out the effect of a
13

14

15

16

Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systematic, and Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-State Arbitration, 112 AM. J.
INT’L L. 410, 414–15 (2018).
Daniel Behn, Malcolm Langford & Laura Letourneau-Tremblay, Empirical Perspectives on Investment
Arbitration: What Do We Know? Does It Matter?, 21 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 188, 190 (2020).
Working Group III: Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L.,
https://perma.cc/DKT7-A97T.
See id.

17

Sergio Puig & Gregory Shaffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law,
112 AM. J. INT’L L. 361, 361 (2018).

18

Abebe et al., supra note 9, at 4.
See Hebert Smith, Effects of Causes and Causes of Effects, Some Remarks from the Sociological Side, 43 SOCIO.
METHODS & RSCH. 406, 409 (2014).
See Abebe et al., supra note 9, at 15–17.

19

20
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particular factor in a clean manner. In addition, unlike studies evaluating policy
merits or effectiveness in the domestic setting that can leverage variations at the
jurisdictional level (for example, a difference in differences study examining the
employment effect of minimum wage increases in New Jersey versus
Pennsylvania), it is difficult for international law scholars to find such variations
to figure out whether a policy or institutional option is desirable or not, as
international law is meant to be international and universal.
That said, this does not mean causal identification is impossible in the study
of international law. As Shaffer and Ginsburg pointed out almost a decade ago,
empirical work in international law should be guided by conditional international
law theory, which focuses on the conditions under which international law is
produced and has effects.21 One empirical strategy for conditional international
law theory is to leverage variations in the contexts in which international law
operates, such as variations in the underlying treaty provisions, in the legal claims
advanced during dispute settlement, and in the international law participants
themselves. With the increased availability of fine-grained international law data
and the development in identification strategies, one can employ a research design
that exploits variations in the aforementioned dimensions to draw causal
inferences in studying questions related to existing problems, such as why certain
countries chose to terminate the international investment treaties they signed or
what has led to prolonged proceedings in ISDS and WTO dispute settlement.
Importantly, one should always be clear about the assumptions being made
and any limitations associated with the methodology or results. Because
international law actors may not be familiar with sophisticated statistical methods,
transparency on methodology and caution against overclaiming can help alleviate
potential concerns about the credibility of the results.
The challenges of causal inferences in the international law context make it
important to combine quantitative analysis with qualitative methods which
contribute to the development of theories guiding quantitative research and
provide valuable insights where quantitative methods have limitations. Another
area that awaits more future work is the replication of prior research findings,
which will generate more confidence that reform proposals made on the basis of
existing social science research are, in fact, supported by robust empirical evidence.
In the remainder of this Essay, I use the excessive duration and costs
problem of ISDS proceedings as an example to discuss how social science
research may be applied to explore causes of a problem and shed light on potential
solutions.

21

Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 1.
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II. S OCIAL S CIENCE R ESEARCH AND THE E XCESSIVE
D URATION AND C OSTS P ROBLEM OF ISDS
ISDS is a dispute settlement mechanism that allows foreign investors to
bring claims against sovereign states before arbitral tribunals for alleged violations
of the latter’s investment protection obligations. ISDS has long been criticized for
its lengthy and costly proceedings.22 According to UNCITRAL, an average ISDS
case lasts for approximately 3.75 years, which translates into average litigation and
arbitration costs of millions of dollars for each side of the dispute.23 The excessive
length (and relatedly, excessive costs) of investor-state arbitration, which was
designed to be a cost- and time-effective dispute settlement system, has given rise
to wide criticism from countries participating in the process.24 However, while
there has been a recent increase in empirical research documenting this problem,25
few studies have empirically examined the causes of the excessive duration and
costs problem. 26 Different diagnoses of the causes may point to different
prescriptions to address the problem. In particular, if one cause for prolonged
proceedings is that countries are unwilling to settle cases because of domestic
political pressure, then perhaps more institutional reform efforts should be
focused on dispute prevention and mitigation at the domestic level rather than
case management reforms or other procedural changes at the international level.
In a new article, I examine this potential cause by exploring the influence of
domestic political pressure on state settlement behavior in ISDS cases. 27 The
overall settlement rate in ISDS is much lower than what is typical in other litigation
settings—only around twenty percent of all concluded ISDS cases were settled.28
News reports and surveys of ISDS practitioners show that states are averse to
settlement, which tends to generate public criticism for capitulating to the
demands of foreign investors and “selling out” using public money.29 In a 2018
22

See generally SUSAN D. FRANCK, ARBITRATION COSTS: MYTHS
TREATY ARBITRATION (2019).

23

Secretariat, U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)
— Cost and Duration: Note by the Secretariat, ¶¶ 48, 56, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.153 (Aug.
31, 2018).
FRANCK, supra note 22, at 181–84.

24

AND

REALITIES

IN INVESTMENT

25

See, e.g., José Manuel Álvarez Zárate et al., Duration of Investor-State Dispute Settlement Proceedings, 21 J.
WORLD INV. & TRADE 300, 303–04 (2020).

26

For an exception, see Behn et al., supra note 14, at 18–21.
Weijia Rao, Domestic Politics and Settlement in Investor-State Arbitration, J. LEGAL STUDIES (forthcoming).

27
28

Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, INV. POL’Y HUB, https://perma.cc/L989-QYAN (last updated
Jul. 31, 2020).

29

See, e.g., Bette Hileman, Canada Capitulates on MMT, Settles with Ethyl, CHEM. & ENG’G NEWS (Jul. 27,
1998), https://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/cen-v076n030.p013a; Uchenna Awom & Patience
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survey of ninety-seven experienced practitioners and government officials who
have participated in ISDS proceedings, the most frequently mentioned obstacle
to settlement in investor-state disputes was the desire to shift the blame to a thirdparty adjudicator, so that the government would not have to take responsibility
for compensating foreign investors with public money. 30 These qualitative
findings suggest that domestic political pressure may have caused respondent
states to delay settlement or forego settlement opportunities altogether, which has
the effect of substantially extending the length of arbitration proceedings.
To identify the effect of anticipated domestic public pressure on case
settlement, I exploit variation in election timing in the respondent states and use
it as a proxy for the government’s sensitivity to domestic public pressure. Electoral
disapproval is more likely to translate into loss of political power as elections
approach. Hence, elected officials likely become increasingly cautious with settling
with foreign investors in the run-up to elections. On the other hand, the time left
until the next election should be exogenous to case quality. Thus, the research
design allows one to draw causal inferences about the effects of domestic political
pressure on state settlement decisions.
In the article, I find that a state becomes less likely to settle an ISDS case as
it gets closer to the next election of the state leader. This finding suggests that
state settlement decisions in ISDS are not made solely based on case merits.
Instead, case settlement also appears to be affected by a political calculus which
fluctuates based on election timing. Such political influence leads to delay, and in
cases where domestic political pressure is high enough, a failure to settle. This
corroborates prior qualitative findings and points to domestic political influence
on state settlement decisions as a cause of lengthy and costly ISDS proceedings.
This finding has direct normative implications regarding pursuing reforms
to address the problem of excessive duration (and relatedly, excessive costs)
associated with ISDS proceedings. UNCITRAL has identified several possible
measures to address concerns about excessive duration and costs, including
promotion of dispute prevention and mitigation policies, implementing stricter
timelines, adding new procedural rules to prevent disputing parties from delaying
the process, establishing advisory centers to provide legal advice to countries, and
providing arbitrators with case management training. 31 A majority of these
measures aim to shorten case duration and reduce associated costs through

Akpuru, Nigeria: Malabu Deal Latest—Shell’s Dirty Lies, ALLAFRICA (May 24, 2012),
https://perma.cc/D7DH-HN4U; Seraphina Chew, Lucy Reed & J Christopher Thomas, Report:
Survey on Obstacles to Settlement of Investor-State Disputes 1 (NUS Ctr. for Int’l L. Working Paper, Paper
No. 2018/022, 2018), https://perma.cc/8V28-SEUS.
30
31

Chew et al., supra note 29, at 12.
Secretariat, U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., supra note 23, ¶ 101.
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reforming various procedural aspects of ISDS.32 While such procedural reform
efforts can be valuable, the finding that countries’ settlement decisions are affected
by domestic political pressure highlights the importance of mechanisms that
insulate respondent state decision makers in ISDS proceedings from such
domestic political pressure. Without such mechanisms in place, even if reforms
are made to improve case management and streamline the proceedings, case
duration and costs may not be substantially reduced when domestic political
pressure forces respondent states to continue litigation without settlement.
One way to insulate settlement decision makers from domestic political
pressure is to delegate the decision-making power to a specialized agency or
commission and have legal experts there issue detailed reports to explain the
reasoning behind the settlement decision, illustrating why settlement is the
desirable strategy in a particular case. These legal experts should be less susceptible
to domestic political pressure as compared to politicians, and collective decision
may further relieve them of concerns about potential repercussions from the
domestic public. An expert report with detailed reasoning also helps elected
officials justify the settlement decision to domestic audiences, which can mitigate
potential domestic backlash against settlement with foreign investors.
A few Latin American countries have already established mechanisms
serving similar purposes. 33 Peru, for example, established an inter-agency
commission, Coordination and Response System for International Investment
Disputes (SICRECI), which specializes in the prevention and handling of
investor-state disputes.34 Among other things, this commission is responsible for
“assessing the possibility of reaching a settlement in the direct negotiation stage
and participating in these negotiations.” 35 The work of the commission is
supported by a Technical Secretariat, whose core functions include “conducting
an initial assessment of the dispute and preparing a preliminary report that is
submitted to the other members; preparing reports on courses of action and
strategies and any other information necessary for the Commission to perform its

32

Addressing concerns about time and costs through procedural reforms has also been the focus of
ICSID’s ongoing rules amendment project. See Meg Kinnear, Continuity and Change in the ICSID
System: Challenges and Opportunities in the Search for Consensus, https://perma.cc/98ZQ3CPA.

33

See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: PREVENTION AND ALTERNATIVES
TO ARBITRATION, at 86, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/11, U.N. Sales No. E.10.II.D.11
(2010) https://perma.cc/66C3-NCES.
Ricardo Ampuero Llerena, Peru’s State Coordination and Response System for International Investment
Disputes, INV. TREATY NEWS (Jan. 14, 2013), https://perma.cc/WK9T-56WR.
See id.

34

35
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duties.”36 In addition, the commission also works closely with the Peruvian entities
responsible for concluding investment agreements to impose new requirements
on foreign investors. Under these new requirements, investors have to present
detailed information about the dispute at the time of dispute notification, so as to
“facilitate the complete and full understanding of the dispute by the Special
Commission . . . [to] increase the possibility of achieving a satisfactory outcome
in the negotiation stage.”37
By requiring legal experts in the Special Commission to issue reports
detailing the reasoning for the litigation (or settlement) strategies, based on all of
the available information about the dispute, these institutional arrangements have
the potential of insulating the decision makers from domestic political pressure so
that they can make settlement decisions based on case merits rather than political
whims. In this way, more cases, which otherwise would not be settled due to
intense domestic political pressure, will be settled, likely at earlier stages of the
dispute. Indeed, Peru credits its system with averting around 300 potential
arbitration proceedings. 38 The facilitation of early settlement (when it is
demonstrated to be more desirable than litigation) relieves respondent states of
the burden of spending considerable public funds and resources defending
investor claims, therefore contributing to the reduction of duration and costs of
ISDS proceedings.
Another mechanism that may serve similar purposes is to have a third party
independently assess the facts of a dispute and issue a report of its fact findings,
upon which respondent state governments can rely to make settlement decisions.
In this regard, ICSID’s most recent rules amendment proposals contain a standalone set of rules for fact-finding, which offer states and investors the opportunity
to constitute a committee to make objective findings of fact that could resolve
their dispute.39 Reports resulting from these fact-finding proceedings can provide
basis for respondent state governments’ settlement decisions and therefore
alleviate their concerns about domestic backlash (to the extent that the report
implies settlement is likely more desirable than litigation). Of course, strict time
limits need to be imposed so that the fact-finding will not become another costly
and drawn-out process itself.

36

37

Id.; see also U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., BEST PRACTICES IN INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT:
HOW TO PREVENT AND MANAGE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: LESSONS FROM PERU, at 35 (2011)
https://perma.cc/5H2H-7JGG.
See Llerena, supra note 34.

38

See Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into Bilateral
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 118 (2013).

39

ICSID, Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules Working Paper 4 (2020), 193–204,
https://perma.cc/9NXJ-DLNS.
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III. S OCIAL S CIENCE R ESEARCH AND O THER A SPECTS OF
ISDS R EFORM
The social science approach can be extended to study a broader range of
problems in the international investment law sphere that are pertinent to ongoing
ISDS reform discussions. For example, many critics consider the recent explosion
of ISDS cases to be a major factor in contributing to a number of countries’
terminations of bilateral investment treaties. 40 Countries learn about the
consequences of their treaty commitments through their experiences in ISDS
disputes, which propels them to terminate these treaties.41 This has brought a lot
of blame and controversy to ISDS, which is now at the center of a legitimacy crisis.
However, an alternative or additional cause of the problem may be that these
countries did not carefully negotiate the terms of these treaties and, as a result, are
more likely to renege on their prior commitments. These two causes implicate
different reform options to address the problem. While one suggests that more
should be done to improve the fairness and quality of ISDS decisions, which is
what most reform proposals in the area have centered on so far, the other points
to the importance of having countries spend more effort and use more expertise
in negotiating treaties. More social science research on this issue will help redirect
reform efforts to needed places.
As another example, also in the context of ISDS reform, while countries
share concerns over lack of impartiality and independence among arbitrators, their
views diverge when it comes to deciding which reforms to pursue to address this
problem. Some countries advocate for an overhaul of the ISDS system by
replacing investor-state arbitration with a multilateral investment court, whereas
other countries favor retaining the existing system but instituting more
incremental reforms that redress these specific concerns. 42 More social science
research on what causes biased decisions can help provide states with a clearer
picture regarding which path to pursue. For instance, if there is no evidence that
reappointment incentives per se, which are inherent to ad hoc appointment—the
defining feature of arbitration—lead to biased decisions, then perhaps more
incremental reforms, such as refining the arbitrator’s code of conduct, address the
problem better than a systematic overhaul does.43

40

See Yoram Z. Haftel & Alexander Thompson, When Do States Renegotiate Investment Agreements? The
Impact of Arbitration, 13 REV. INT’L ORG. 25, 33 (2018).

41

See id.
See Roberts, supra note 13, at 411.

42
43

See Weijia Rao, Are Arbitrators Biased in ICSID Arbitration? A Dynamic Perspective, 66 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. (forthcoming 2021).
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IV. C ONCLUSION
In a time when international law is facing significant challenges and
undergoing rapid changes, Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg’s call for more social
science research in the field is timely and important. The social science research
on international law has so far largely focused on documenting existing problems
and examining high-level theoretical questions. This Essay posits that to inform
reforms of international institutions, more social science research should be
focused on identifying the causes of these problems and proposing policies or
reforms that specifically address those underlying causes. This requires us to
explore new frontiers of the conditional international law theory and exploit
variations in both the substance of international law and international law
participants. In an international setting where decision-making requires the
consensus of a wide range of stakeholders, obtaining a comprehensive
understanding of what caused existing problems is both important and necessary
for implementing tailored reforms that help the field of international law
overcome challenges at a pivotal time.
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